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The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory

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Abstract.

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

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Manuscript received: March 2000/Final version received: February 2001

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Dufwenberg, M., Norde, H., Reijnierse, H. et al. The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory. Mathematical Methods of OR 54, 119–131 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100154

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100154

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