Skip to main content
Log in

An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

We prove a theorem on the intersection of the Weber sets (Weber, 1988) of two ordered cooperative games. From this theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete separation theorem (Frank, 1982). We introduce a definition of general largeness, proving that the Weber set is large for any cooperative game.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Carles Rafels.

Additional information

Institutional support from research grants SGR2001-0029 and BEC 2002-00642 is gratefully acknowledged.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Martínez-de-Albéniz, F., Rafels, C. An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory. Int J Game Theory 33, 107–114 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400188

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400188

Keywords

Navigation