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Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems

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Abstract.

We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA; e-mail: bklaus1@unl.edu, , , , , , US

    Bettina Klaus

  2. Department of Economics, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA; e-mail: em437@columbia.edu, , , , , , US

    Eiichi Miyagawa

Authors
  1. Bettina Klaus
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  2. Eiichi Miyagawa
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Received: November 1999/Final version: December 2001

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Klaus, B., Miyagawa, E. Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems. Game Theory 30, 421–435 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100088

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100088

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