Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Note Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

We prove that the existence of equilibrium payoffs for stochastic games of incomplete symmetric information follows from the same result for stochastic games with complete information.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Département de Mathématiques et d'Informatique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 45 rue d'Ulm – 75005 Paris. France., , , , , , FR

    Julien Geitner

Authors
  1. Julien Geitner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Received January 1999/Revised October 2001

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Geitner, J. Note Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case. Game Theory 30, 449–452 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100084

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100084

Search

Navigation