Abstract.
In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also define and axiomatize the egalitarian core, a set of core allocations for which no transfer from a rich player to a poor player is possible without violating the core restrictions. We find an inclusive relation of the leximin stable allocation and of the Lorenz stable set into the egalitarian core.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Received: October 1999/Final version: July 2001
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Arin, J., Inarra, E. Egalitarian solutions in the core. Game Theory 30, 187–193 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100073
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100073