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Note On the core of a collection of coalitions

On the core of a collection of coalitions

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Abstract

. For a collection Ω of subsets of a finite set N we define its core to be equal to the polyhedral cone {xIR N: ∑ i∈N x i =0 and ∑ i∈S x i ≥0 for all S∈Ω}. This note describes several applications of this concept in the field of cooperative game theory. Especially collections Ω are considered with core equal to {0}. This property of a one-point core is proved to be equivalent to the non-degeneracy and balancedness of Ω. Further, the notion of exact cover is discussed and used in a second characterization of collections Ω with core equal to {0}.

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Received May 1997/Final version May 1998

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Derks, J., Reijnierse, H. Note On the core of a collection of coalitions. Game Theory 27, 451–459 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050084

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050084

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