Abstract
We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 17:89–99, 1988) and Nowak (Int J Game Theory 26:137–141, 1997) as well as most of the characterizations by Casajus (Theory Decis 71:365–372, 2011b) are redundant. Further, we explore symmetry implications of Lehrer’s 2-efficiency axiom.
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References
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Casajus, A. Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value. Int J Game Theory 41, 497–515 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0300-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0300-z