Abstract
Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.
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Tauman, Y., Zapechelnyuk, A. On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions. Int J Game Theory 39, 171–175 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0196-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0196-z