Abstract
Given an assignment market, we introduce a set of vectors, one for each possible ordering on the player set, which we name the max-payoff vectors. Each one of these vectors is obtained recursively only making use of the assignment matrix. Those max-payoff vectors that are efficient turn out to give the extreme core allocations of the market. When the assignment game has a large core, all the max-payoff vectors are extreme core allocations.
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Izquierdo, J.M., Núñez, M. & Rafels, C. A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market. Int J Game Theory 36, 17–26 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0091-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0091-4