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Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts

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Abstract

For any preference profile at which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally inefficient there exists an ordering exchange contract inducing an ordinally efficient random allocation that ordinally dominates the random serial dictatorship allocation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

    Mihai Manea

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  1. Mihai Manea
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Correspondence to Mihai Manea.

Additional information

I thank Fuhito Kojima, Al Roth and a referee for helpful comments.

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Manea, M. Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts. Int J Game Theory 36, 489–496 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0088-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0088-z

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