Abstract
While a bulk of literature in the last two decades confirms a nonlinear relationship between inflation and output growth, the inflation thresholds above which it reduces output growth remain high for developing countries compared to their developed counterparts. Cukierman et al. (Am Econ Rev 82(3):537–555, 1992) posit that the developing economies observe strong political instability and polarization, which makes inflation tax optimal choice for these countries. This study empirically supports these views by using an innovative threshold model and system GMM approaches for a large panel of 113 economies over the period 1981–2015. Moreover, our results show a minimum level of institutional quality above which the inflation–growth relationship is negative and below it is nonexistent.
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Notes
For the emerging economies, Khan and Senhadji (2001) suggest 11% inflation rate, Sarel (1996) identifies 8% inflation rate and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) and Kremer et al. (2013) find further higher threshold levels at around 17%. All of these studies contend that the growth-inhibiting effects of inflation start appearing after these levels.
Bruno and Easterly (1998) reveal an important aspect of this negative relationship. Their study shows that this inverse relationship is mainly driven by high-inflation episodes and that averaging the data for longer time periods eliminates this effect.
A parallel line of literature associates the cost of inflation to countries’ trade structure. Romer (1993) argues that unanticipated monetary expansion causes real exchange rate depreciation. Since the cost of depreciation depends upon level of openness to trade, the benefits of surprise inflation—in terms of higher output—are higher for closed economies. Lane (1997) modifies this argument by claiming that openness–inflation relation is due to imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity in the non-traded sector. The study argues that surprise monetary expansions cause increase in the output of non-traded sector, given its predetermined prices. This output expansion is socially optimal because of the inefficient monopolistic underproduction in the non-traded sector in the equilibrium before the shock.
It is important to mention that in case of multiplicative interaction models, the individual effect of x (independent variable) on y (dependent variable) is sometimes illogical because it estimates the conditional effects when z (intervening variable) takes zero value. However, a zero value of z can be out of sample in many cases (see Brambor et al. 2006).
These include Argentina, Armenia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Croatia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Peru, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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Khan, M., Hanif, W. Institutional quality and the relationship between inflation and economic growth. Empir Econ 58, 627–649 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1479-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1479-7