Abstract
We examine how the spatial economy with multiple industries is shaped when interregional trade costs and intraregional commuting costs are low. All industries are characterized by increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition, and they are differentiated by their trade costs and the degree of intra-industry competition measured by their firm numbers. We find some distinct rules in industrial location. First, at most, one industry disperses, while others agglomerate in a region according to their ratios of relative trade costs to firm numbers. Second, industries with stronger competition constitute a smaller region, while those with higher trade costs compose a larger region. The results are consistent with the classical Weberian location theory and suggest that the degree of intra-industry competition also becomes an essential factor to determine industrial location when transportation costs are small. Finally, the population differential between the regions monotonically decreases in the relative commuting cost.
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Notes
Pflüger (2004) proposes an NEG model in which asymmetric interior equilibria appear by using a quasi-linear upper-tier utility for two types of goods with a CES subutility on the differentiated varieties. Furthermore, Pflüger and Südekum (2008) introduce housing costs into Pflüger (2004) model and show that asymmetric interior equilibria appear in the redispersion process as well. On the other hand, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003) introduce taste heterogeneity of workers and show that asymmetric interior equilibria appear. Differently from their studies, ours stresses the role of multiplicity of industries in determining city size.
For further discussion about the relationship between the Weber and NEG models, see Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).
Note that (Takatsuka and Zeng (2009), Proposition 2) show that the shares of industries located in the larger region are not in order of their trade costs if commuting costs are large.
The assumption of intersectoral immobility of workers is justified as follows. First, changing a profession is often very costly for a skilled worker. Second, this assumption naturally extends the immobility assumption between the agricultural sector and the manufacturing sector imposed in most models in the NEG literature (e.g., Krugman 1991). Finally, the assumption of mobility among industries is accompanied with other restrictive assumptions in order to obtain analytical results (e.g., Tabuchi and Thisse 2006).
Wages might vary across industries, but, in equilibrium, the bid rent function of each type of worker is the same because of the common slope of \(-\theta \).
For trade to occur in all industries, (i) all firms’ net prices of trade costs must be positive and (ii) consumption in all industries must be positive. By a simple calculation, we can check that both conditions are equivalent to the condition of \(\tau <\tau _{\text{ trade}}\).
In our model, we confirm that the first term of (6) (i.e., the market-access effect on firms) dominates the second term of (6) (i.e., the local competition effect) for a sufficiently small \(\tau \), since the former includes a quadratic term and a linear term in \(\tau \) while the latter has a quadratic term only.
(Takatsuka and Zeng (2009), Fig. 3) show that manufacturing industries with high transport costs (e.g., precision instruments and electrical machinery) have remained close to the core while manufacturing industries with low transport costs (e.g., printing and publishing and transportation equipment) have relocated, to a considerable degree, to the periphery in Japan. This suggests that the trade cost is indeed a primary factor of industrial location and our prediction is reasonable.
The numerical simulations in the next section suggest that this relationship holds irrespectively of the size of \(\tau \).
In the case of \(\rho <\rho ^{\dagger }(K,K)\), if \(\rho <4(B_{i}-A_{i}\tau _{trade})\) for any \(i\), then the full agglomeration is always stable. Otherwise, the full agglomeration is stable when \(0<\tau <(4B_{i}-\rho )/4A_{i}\) for any \(i\).
Takatsuka and Zeng (2009) show a similar result in a case that the trade costs are different across industries, while the degree of intra-industry competition (i.e., the number of firms) is the same for all industries.
The range of \(\omega /L\) for each case is as follows: Case (1): 10.5, Case (2): 5.9, Case (3): 3.3, Case (4): 1.0.
We have similar results for other cases.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Tomoya Mori, Takatoshi Tabuchi, three anonymous reviewers, Editor Janet Kohlhase, and the seminar participants at University of Tokyo, Tohoku University, and Chuo University for helpful suggestions. Financial support from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science through Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research 24530303, 22330073, 20730183 for the first author, and 24243036, 24330072, 22330073, 21243021, and the Y.C. Tang disciplinary development fund of Zhejiang University for the second author are acknowledged.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We show that any distribution pattern in which \(k(\ge \!\!\!2)\) types of industries disperse is unstable for a sufficiently small \(\tau \). On the contrary, assume a stable equilibrium in which \(k\) types of industries disperse. Number the dispersing industries by \(1, \ldots ,k\), and consider matrix \(\Delta \equiv (\delta _{ij})_{k\times k}\), where \(\delta _{ij}\) is defined by (8). Because of the stability of this equilibrium with respect to dynamic system (9), all the real parts of the eigenvalues of \((-\Delta )\) must be negative, and, hence, \(\left| \Delta \right| > 0\).
Let
and let \((\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})\) be the matrix \(\Upsilon \) with its \(i\) th column replaced by \(\Theta _{i}\). It holds that
In (18), \(|\Upsilon |\) is a \(\tau \)-polynomial of degree \(2k\), while \(|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})|\) is a \(\tau \)-polynomial of degree \( 2k-1\). According to Lemma 4, all terms with orders below \((2k\!-\!2)\) in (18) disappear. In other words, the terms of order \((2k\!-\!2)\) in the polynomials are significant if \(\tau \) is small enough. Furthermore, according to Lemma 5, \(|\Delta |\!<\!0\) holds when \(\tau \) is small. The contradiction implies that plural industries could not disperse simultaneously.\(\square \)
Lemma 4
All terms with orders below \((2k-2)\) in (18) are zero.
Proof
First, we consider \(\left|\Upsilon \right|\). The elements of \(\Upsilon \) are composed of \(\tau ^{2}\)-terms (\(\mu _{1}\), \(\xi _{1}\), \(\psi _{i}\)) and \(\tau \)-terms (\(\mu _{2}\), \( \xi _{2}\)). If \(\left|\Upsilon \right|\) is decomposed into a sum of determinants, in which each column is composed of \(\tau ^{2}\)-terms only or \(\tau \)-terms only, the terms of order below \((2k-2)\) in \(\left|\Upsilon \right|\) could then be represented as a sum of determinants with at least three columns that are composed of only \(\tau \)-terms. One of the determinants, for example, is
Of course, this result holds even if the columns with \(\tau \)-terms are in different places.
Next, we consider \(\sum _{i=1}^{k}\left|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})\right|\). If \(\left|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})\right|\) is decomposed into a sum of determinants, as in the above case, the term of order below \((2k-2)\) in \(|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})|\) could then be represented as a sum of determinants with at least two columns that are composed of \(\tau \)-terms only except for the \(i\)th column. One of the determinants, for example, is
Of course, this result holds even if the columns with \(\tau \)-terms, and \( \Theta _{i}\) are in different places.
Therefore, we have shown that all terms of orders below \((2k\!-\!2)\) in\(|\Delta |\) are zero. \(\square \)
Lemma 5
The term of order \(2k-2\) in \(|\Upsilon |\) is negative, while the term of order \((2k-2)\) in \(\sum _{i=1}^{k}|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})|\) is zero.
Proof
First, for \(m\ne n\ne i\in \{1,\ldots ,k\}\), let
Then
For convenience, we introduce notation
for \(m,n,i\in \{1,2,\ldots ,k\}\). Then, it holds that
Now, we consider the \(\tau ^{(2k-2)}\)-term in \(\left|\Upsilon \right|\), which can be represented as a sum of determinants that has only two columns with \(\tau \)-terms. One of the determinant, for example, is calculated as
where (22) is from (19), and (23) is from (20).
Similarly, the determinant having \(\tau \)-terms in the \(m\)th and \(n\)th columns is obtained as
The \(\tau ^{(2k-2)}\)-term in \(\left|\Upsilon \right|\) is the sum of the above determinants for all nonordered pairs \((m,n)\) with \(m\ne n\in \{1,\ldots ,k\}\), which is calculated as
where (24) is from (21), and inequality (25) is from (13).
Next, we consider the \(\tau ^{(2k-2)}\)-term in \(\sum _{i=1}^{k}\left|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})\right|\). This term is the sum of determinants having only one column with \(\tau \)-terms besides the \(i\)th column. They can be calculated as in the case of \(\left|\Upsilon \right|\). For example, one determinant of \(|(\Theta _{1},\Upsilon ^{-1})|\) is
where
Note that \(|(\Theta _{2},\Gamma ^{-2})|\) has a similar determinant with \( \omega _{1}L_{2}-\omega _{2}L_{1}\) replaced by \(\omega _{2}L_{1}-\omega _{1}L_{2}\), and \(\varrho (1,2,i)\) replaced by \(\varrho (2,1,i)\). Furthermore, it is easy to check that \(\varrho (1,2,i)+\varrho (2,1,i)=0\) holds. Therefore, the sum of these two determinants is zero. For this reason, the \(\tau ^{(2k-2)}\)-term in \(\sum _{i=1}^{k}\left|(\Theta _{i},\Upsilon ^{-i})\right|\) is zero. In conclusion, the \(\tau ^{(2k-2)} \)-term in \(\left|\Delta \right|\) is negative.\(\square \)
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
-
(i)
follows directly from (13).
-
(ii)
Since \(\sum _{j=1}^{l-1}L_j>\sum _{j=l}^KL_j\), we have
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{j=1}^{l-1}\omega _j-\sum _{j=l}^K\omega _j>\frac{\omega _l}{L_l}\biggr ( \sum _{j=1}^{l-1}L_j-\sum _{j=l}^KL_j\biggr )>0, \end{aligned}$$where the first inequality is from (13). The first inequality can be rewritten as
$$\begin{aligned} \omega _l\biggr (\sum _{j=1}^{l-1}L_j-\sum _{j=l}^KL_j\biggr )< L_l\biggr ( \sum _{j=1}^{l-1}\omega _j-\sum _{j=l}^K\omega _j\biggr ), \end{aligned}$$and, hence,
$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{\sum _{j=1}^{l-1}\omega _j-\sum _{j=l}^K\omega _j}{\sum _{j=1}^{l-1}L_j- \sum _{j=l}^KL_j} >\frac{\sum _{j=1}^{l-1}\omega _j-\sum _{j=l}^K\omega _j+2 \omega _l}{\sum _{j=1}^{l-1}L_j-\sum _{j=l}^KL_j+2L_l}\nonumber \\&\quad \,=\frac{ \sum _{j=1}^l\omega _j-\sum _{j=l+1}^K\omega _j}{\sum _{j=1}^lL_j- \sum _{j=l+1}^KL_j}, \end{aligned}$$which derives \(\rho ^{\dagger }(l, l)<\rho ^{\dagger }(l, l-1)\).
-
(iii)
In a similar manner to (ii), we have
$$\begin{aligned} 0<\omega _{l}\biggr (\sum _{j=1}^{l}L_{j}-\sum _{j=l+1}^{K}L_{j}\biggr )<L_{l} \biggr (\sum _{j=1}^{l}\omega _{j}-\sum _{j=l+1}^{K}\omega _{j}\biggr ) \end{aligned}$$
since \(\sum _{j=1}^{l}L_{j}>\sum _{j=l+1}^{K}L_{j}\). Therefore, the last term of (14) is positive, and, thus, \(\rho ^{\dagger }(i,l)>0\) holds for any \(i\).\(\square \)
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2
(Necessity) Let \(\varvec{\lambda }^{*}\) be an equilibrium of pattern (a), in which \(l\) industries \(i_{1},\ldots ,i_{l}\) agglomerate in region \(H\) and \(K-l\) industries \(i_{l+1},\ldots ,i_{K}\) agglomerate in region \(F\). Then, for each industry \(i\), it holds that
For a sufficiently small \(\tau \), the sign of the above expression is determined by the coefficient of \(\tau \). Because of (11), the populations of two regions are different, and, hence, \( \sum _{j=1}^{l}L_{i_{j}}>\sum _{j=l+1}^{K}L_{i_{j}}\), because of our naming that \(H\) is not smaller than \(F\). Since industries \(i_{1},\ldots ,i_{l}\) are in \(H\), the stability conditions requires \(V_{i_{j}H}(\varvec{\lambda } ^{*})-V_{i_{j}F}(\varvec{\lambda }^{*})\ge 0\) for \(j=1,\ldots ,l\), which implies
On the other hand, since industries \(i_{l+1},\ldots ,i_{K}\) are in \(F\), we have \(V_{i_{j}H}(\varvec{\lambda }^{*})-V_{i_{j}F}(\varvec{\lambda } ^{*})\le 0\) for \(j=l+1,\ldots ,K\), which implies
The following inequality holds directly from (26) and (27):
From (13), (28) tells us that \(i_{l}=l\ge l_{\sharp }\), the industries located in \(H\) turn out to be \(1,\ldots ,l\), and the industries located in \(F\) turn out to be \(l+1,\ldots ,K\). Therefore, (26) and ( 27) are summarized as \(\rho \in [\rho ^{\dagger }(l+1,l),\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l)]\). Note that Lemma 1 (i) and (iii) imply that \(0<\rho ^{\dagger }(l+1,l)<\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l)\).
(Sufficiency) Let \(l\) be an industry satisfying \(l\ge l_{\sharp }\) and \( \rho \in (\rho ^{\dagger }(l+1,l),\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l))\), and let \(\varvec{ \lambda }^{*}\) be the distribution in which industries \(1,\ldots ,l\) agglomerate in region \(H\) and industries \(l+1,\ldots ,K\) agglomerate in region \(F\). Then,
whose sign is determined by the coefficient of \(\tau \) for a sufficiently small \(\tau \). From \(\rho \in (\rho ^{\dagger }(l+1,l),\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l)) \), we have
Furthermore, since \(\sum _{j=1}^{l}L_{j}>\sum _{j=l+1}^{K}L_{j}\), we soon obtain \(V_{iH}(\varvec{\lambda }^{*})-V_{iF}(\varvec{\lambda }^{*})>0 \) for \(i=1,\ldots ,l\) and \(V_{iH}(\varvec{\lambda }^{*})-V_{iF}( \varvec{\lambda }^{*})<0\) for \(i=l+1,\ldots ,K\); therefore, \(\varvec{ \lambda }^{*}\) is a stable equilibrium.\(\square \)
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 3
(Necessity) Consider a stable equilibrium \(\varvec{\lambda }^{*}\), in which industries \(i_{1},\ldots ,i_{l_{1}}\) are located in region \(H\) and industries \(j_{1},\ldots ,j_{l_{2}}\) are located in region \(F\), while industry \(l\) disperses with population \(\lambda _{l}^{*}L_{l}\) in region \(H\). Then, \(l_{1}+l_{2}+1=K\) and \(V_{lH}(\varvec{\lambda }^{*})-V_{lF}( \varvec{\lambda }^{*})=0\), from which we have
where
Noteworthily, \(\mathcal{E }=0\) holds only if \(\rho =4ab(3b-c)\overline{L} \omega _{l}/[(2b-c)^{2}L_{l}\rho ]\), which implies \(\mathcal{C }=4ab^{2} \overline{L}(L_{l}\Omega _{2}-\Lambda \omega _{l})\ne 0\) according to (12), so that (30) is infinitely large for small \(\tau \). Meanwhile, \(\lambda _{l}^{*}\) of (30) is inside \([0,1]\). Therefore, we can exclude the case of \(\mathcal{E }=0\) for the discussion on the case of a small \(\tau \), which we focus on. Let
For equilibrium \(\varvec{\lambda }^{*}\) to be stable, one necessary condition is that
Note that the above inequality also implies \(\mathcal{E }>0\).
By the naming of regions, \(H\) is larger than \(F\), which is expressed as follows:
For sufficiently small \(\tau \), (36) is rewritten as
which turns out to be
according to (35) and the assumption of (12).
On the other hand, the utility differential is calculated as
for any \(i\ne l\). Therefore, two other stability conditions of equilibrium \( \varvec{\lambda }^{*}\)
are simply rewritten as
Therefore, the industries in region \(H\) turn out to be \(1,\ldots ,l-1\), and the industries in region \(F\) turn out to be \(l+1,\ldots ,K\). Furthermore, \( l\ge l_{\sharp }\) because of (36).
Now, we derive (17). First, \(\rho >\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l)\) holds from (33), (16) and the facts of \(\bar{\lambda }_{l}\le 1\). If \(l>l_{\sharp }\), then \(l-1\ge l_{\sharp }\) so that \(\Lambda >L_l\) holds from the first inequality of (15). Then, \(\rho <\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l-1)\) holds from (32), (16) and the fact of \( \bar{\lambda }_{l}\ge 0\).
(Sufficiency) Consider a distribution \(\varvec{\lambda }^*\) such that industry \(l\ge l_{\sharp }\) disperses with population \(\lambda _{l}^{*}L_{l}\) in region \(H\), industries \(1,\ldots ,l-1\) agglomerate in \(H\), industry \(l+1,\ldots ,K\) agglomerate in \(F\), and (17) holds. According to (13), we have \(L_l\omega _i>L_i\omega _l\) and \( L_l\omega _j<L_j\omega _l\) for \(i=1,\ldots , l-1\) and \(j=l+1, \ldots , K\), which implies
proving (37), in which \(\Omega _2\) and \(\Lambda \) are defined in (31) with industry names \(i_k=k\) and \(j_k=l+k\). We consider two cases separately.
Case (i): If \(l>l_\sharp \), then \(l-1\ge L_\sharp \) so that \(\Lambda >L_l\) from the first inequality of (15). Then, \(\mathcal{E }>\mathcal C >0\) hold from (32) and (33), implying \(\bar{\lambda }_l\in (0,1)\) , defined by (34). On the other hand, \(\delta _{ll}>0\) and ( 38) are immediate results. Therefore, distribution \(\varvec{ \lambda }^*\) is a stable equilibrium.
Case (ii): If \(l=l_{\sharp }\), then \(\Lambda <L_{l}\) from the second inequality of (15). Therefore,
holds from (37), implying \(\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l-1)<\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l)\). Thus, \(\rho >\rho ^{\dagger }(l,l-1)\) holds, and we obtain \(\mathcal{C }>0\) and \(\mathcal{E }>0\) again from (32) and (33 ). As in case (i), we have \(\bar{\lambda }_{l}\in (0,1)\), \(\delta _{ll}>0\) and (38).
Finally, from (8), (29), and (31), we have
We know that the numerator is nonnegative from (36) and that \(\delta _{ll}\) is also nonnegative from (35) if \(\varvec{\lambda }^{*}\) is a stable equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that \(\partial \lambda _{l}^{*}/\partial \rho \le 0\) when \(\varvec{\lambda }^{*}\) is a stable equilibrium. Note that this inequality holds even if \(\tau \) is large. \(\square \)
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Takatsuka, H., Zeng, DZ. Industrial configuration in an economy with low transportation costs. Ann Reg Sci 51, 593–620 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-013-0553-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-013-0553-5