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Legal personhood for the integration of AI systems in the social context: a study hypothesis

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Abstract

In this paper, I shall set out the pros and cons of assigning legal personhood on artificial intelligence systems (AIs) under civil law. More specifically, I will provide arguments supporting a functionalist justification for conferring personhood on AIs, and I will try to identify what content this legal status might have from a regulatory perspective. Being a person in law implies the entitlement to one or more legal positions. I will mainly focus on liability as it is one of the main grounds for the attribution of legal personhood, like for collective legal entities. A better distribution of responsibilities resulting from unpredictably illegal and/or harmful behaviour may be one of the main reasons to justify the attribution of personhood also for AI systems. This means an efficient allocation of the risks and social costs associated with the use of AIs, ensuring the protection of victims, incentives for production, and technological innovation. However, the paper also considers other legal positions triggered by personhood in addition to responsibility: specific competencies and powers such as, for example, financial autonomy, the ability to hold property, make contracts, sue (and be sued).

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Notes

  1. There are legal systems in which such statuses have been already recognised, to the extent that the term environmental and animal personhood is used in this regard. Some examples are New Zealand and India, which have recognised legal personhood for rivers.

  2. The risk criterion and the adoption of a similar system, was proposed in the expert group report on AI liability to the European Commission: Liability for artificial intelligence and other emerging digital technologies (2019): https://op.europa.eu/it/publication-detail/-/publication/1c5e30be-1197-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.

  3. This is from the European Commission website on ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’: ‘Regulatory framework proposal on artificial intelligence’, link: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai.

  4. European Commission, Brussels, 21.4.2021, Com(2021) 206 Final, 2021/0106(Cod), Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council. Laying Down Harmonised Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, p. 13.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Law, Science and Technology, CIRSFID—Alma AI, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Claudio Novelli

  2. Droit, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF), University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg City, Luxembourg

    Claudio Novelli

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Novelli, C. Legal personhood for the integration of AI systems in the social context: a study hypothesis. AI & Soc 38, 1347–1359 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01384-w

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