Abstract.
In this paper we consider multiple encryption schemes built from conventional cryptosystems such as DES. The existing schemes are either vulnerable to variants of meet-in-the-middle attacks, i.e., they do not provide security corresponding to the full key length used or there is no proof that the schemes are as secure as the underlying cipher. We propose a variant of two-key triple encryption with a new method of generating three keys from two. Our scheme is not vulnerable to the meet-in-the-middle attack and, under an appropriate assumption, we can show that our scheme is at least about as hard to break as the underlying block cipher.
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Received 22 June 1995 and revised 11 October 1996
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Damgård, I., Knudsen, L. Two-Key Triple Encryption . J. Cryptology 11, 209–218 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001459900044
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001459900044