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The Copeland method

I.: Relationships and the dictionary

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Summary

A central political and decision science issue is to understand how election outcomes can change with the choice of a procedure or the slate of candidates. These questions are answered for the important Copeland method (CM) where, with a geometric approach, we characterize all relationships among the rankings of positional voting methods and the CM. Then, we characterize all ways CM rankings can vary as candidates enter or leave the election. In this manner new CM strengths and flaws are detected.

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Additional information

We would like to thank C. Mount for her careful reading of the manuscript. The work of DG Saari was supported by NSF Grant IRI 9103180. This research was done while V. Merlin was visiting North-western University.

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Saari, D.G., Merlin, V.R. The Copeland method. Econ Theory 8, 51–76 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01212012

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01212012

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