Abstract.
The paper seeks to formalize the notion of effective freedom or the freedom to realize meaningful choices. The definition of meaningful choice used in this paper is based on the preference orderings that a reasonable person may have. I argue that only alternatives that can be selected by a reasonable person from the set of all possible alternatives provide a meaningful choice. I discuss this approach and provide an axiomatization of the cardinality rule and two lexicographic versions of this rule in this context.
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Received: 24 September 1996/Accepted: 26 January 2000
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Romero-Medina, A. More on preference and freedom. Soc Choice Welfare 18, 179–191 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007180
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007180