Summary.
A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear cost queueing problems are first best implementable. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost structures for which queueing problems are first best implementable. The broad conclusion is that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these first best implementable problems can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Received: October 19, 1999; revised version: March 13, 2000.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mitra, M. Mechanism design in queueing problems. Econ Theory 17, 277–305 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004107
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004107