Abstract
The received view is that psychology has undergone several scientific revolutions similar to those that occurred in the physical sciences. Of these, this paper will consider the cognitive revolution. Because the arguments in favor of the existence of a cognitive revolution are cast using the concepts and terms of revolutionary science, we will examine the cognitive revolution using accounts of revolutionary science advanced by five influential philosophers of science. Specifically, we will draw from the philosophical positions of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, and Gross for the purpose of discussion. We conclude that no substantive revolution took place according to these accounts. This conclusion is based on data gathered from some of the major participants in the “cognitive revolution” and on a general scholarly survey of the literature. We argue that the so-called cognitive revolution is best characterized as a socio-rhetorical phenomenon.
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O’Donohue, W., Ferguson, K.E. & Naugle, A.E. The structure of the cognitive revolution: An examination from the philosophy of science. BEHAV ANALYST 26, 85–110 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392069
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392069