Abstract
The main problem in explaining consciousness is accounting for its subjectivity from an internal perspective. In addition, subjective systems have adaptive ability to respond to change and self-organize their own behavior. In this context, the nonlinear emergence of internal explicit states might be studied in natural systems to gain insight into the physical principles involved in the production of consciousness. Since intelligence is the ability to consciously create voluntary new or novel intentional action, standardized tests might provide an index of intelligence, as well as the degree of consciousness present, i.e. IQ might also be a measure of degree of consciousness.
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This paper represents further development of a paper entitled “The Emergence of Consciousness” published in Medical Hypotheses (2004), 63(5), 900–904.
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Sieb, R. Consciousness and Adaptive Behavior. Act Nerv Super 53, 21–26 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03379930
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03379930