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Tests of efficiency wage theory and contract theory with disaggregated data from the U.S.

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Zusammenfassung

Tests der Effizienzlohntheorie und der Kontrakttheorie mit disaggregierten Daten der USA. — Der Autor testet die Voraussagen der Effizienzlohntheorie und der Kontrakttheorie, indem er den Grad der LohnrigiditÄt in sieben wichtigen Sektoren (1-stellige SIC) und 19 gewerblichen Industriezweigen (2-stellige SIC) in den USA schÄtzt. Der Grad der LohnrigiditÄt wird anhand von PhillipskurvenGleichungen, die nach Industrien disaggregiert sind und Indikatoren für die aggregierte Arbeitslosenrate sowie die Nachfrage nach den Produkten der einzelnen Industriezweige enthalten, geschÄtzt. Effizienzlohntheorie und Kontrakttheorie werden getestet, indem die Korrelationen zwischen dem Grad der LohnrigiditÄt in einer Industrie und den Merkmalen einer Industrie, die für die jeweilige Theorie charakteristisch sind, berechnet werden. Die Ergebnisse stützen stark die Effizienzlohntheorie und scheinen für die Kontrakttheorie nicht so günstig zu sein.

Résumé

Des tests de la théorie du salaire efficient et de la théorie de contrat avec des données disaggrégées des Etats Unis. — Cette étude soumet les prédictions de l’hypothèse du salaire efficient et la théorie de contrat à un test en estimant le degré de rigidité des salaires dans 7 secteurs majeurs (1-digit SIC) et 19 secteurs industriels (2-digit SIC) aux Etats Unis. Le degré de rigidité des salaires est estimé par les équations de la courbe de Phillips, disaggrégées par l’industrie, qui incluent des mesures du taux de chÔmage aggrégé et la demande aux produits des secteurs industriels. On soumet la théorie du salaire efficient et la théorie de contrat à un test en calculant les correlations entre le degré de rigidité des salaires et des caractéristiques des secteurs industriels qui se réfèrent à ces théories. Les résultats supportent principalement la théorie du salaire efficient et ne semblent pas Être aussi favorables à la théorie de contrat.

Resumen

Tests de la teoría del salario eficiente y de la teoría del contrato con datos desagregados para los EE UU. — En este trabajo se someten las predicciones de la teoría del salario eficiente y de la teoría del contrato a un test, estimando el grado de rigidez salarial en siete sectores importantes (a nivel de un dígito de la SIC) y 19 industrias manufactureras (a nivel de dos dígitos de la SIC) en los EE UU. El grado de rigidez salarial es estimado usando ecuaciones de la curva de Phillips desagregadas por industria, las cuales incluyen indicadores de la tasa de desempleo agregada y de la demanda de productos industrials. La teoría del salario eficiente y la teoría del contrato son sometidas a un test calculando las correlaciones entre el grado de rigidez salarial de una industria y las caracteristicas de esa industria, relacionadas con estas teorias. Los resultados dan apoyo a la teoria del salario eficiente, mas no parecen ser tan favorables para la teoria del contrato.

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Campbell, C.M. Tests of efficiency wage theory and contract theory with disaggregated data from the U.S.. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 127, 98–118 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02707313

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