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Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

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Abstract

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations.

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Abbreviations

LP:

Linear program

ILP:

integer linear program

CA:

combinatorial auction

GVA:

generalized Vickrey auction

VCG:

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (mechanisms)

WDP:

winner determination problem

FCC:

federal communications commission

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  1. Electronic Enterprises Lab, Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, 560 012, Bangalore, India

    Y. Narahari

  2. GM India Science Lab, General Motors R & D, ITPL Campus, 560 066, Bangalore, India

    Pankaj Dayama

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Narahari, Y., Dayama, P. Combinatorial auctions for electronic business. Sadhana 30, 179–211 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02706244

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