Conclusion
When a technology proprietor cannot exploit his advantage by means of ownership of a production facility abroad, a sales contract with “buy-back provisions” may, in fact, be a trade-enhancing resolution to a situation of information-asymmetry between buyer and seller. The important implication is that not all forms of countertrade can be summarily dismissed as inefficient. Just as foreign direct investment can be seen to be a response to environmental or market imperfections, “buy-back” may be a way to deal with institutional or regulatory obstacles such as the prohibition of foreign ownership.
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Mirus, R., Yeung, B. “Buy-back” in international trade: A rationale. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 122, 371–374 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02705751
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02705751