Very absent-minded persons in going to their bedroom to dress for dinner have been known to take off one garment after another and finally to get into bed, merely because that was the habitual issue of the first few movements when performed at a later hour. (James 1890/1983, p. 119).
My office phone rang. I picked up the receiver and bellowed “come in” at it. (from J.T. Reason, quoted after Norman 1981, p. 7)
Several years ago, U.S. President Gerald Ford toasted Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and “the great people of Israel—Egypt, excuse me”. Later this incident was reported …like this: “I heard Freud made a Fordian slip …[laughs]…wait”. (Dell 1995, p. 183)
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963),Intention, 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1982), “Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’,”Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56, 12–25.
Austin, J.L. (1961). “A Plea for Excuses”, inPhilosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 175–204.
Austin, J.L. (1970),Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, London.
Baier, A. (1971), “The Search for Basic Actions,”American Philosophical Quarterly 8, 161–170.
Baker, L.R. (1982), “De Re Belief in Action”Philosphical Review 91, 363–387.
Bishop, J. (1989),Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Brand, M. (1984),Internding and Action: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Brand, M. (1989), “Proximate Causation of Action,” in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.),Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 3, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, CA, pp. 423–442.
Brandom, R. (1994),Making It Explicit, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Carnap, R. (1962),Logical Foundations of Probability, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Chan, D.K. (1995), “Nonintentional Actions”,American Philosophical Quarterly 32, 139–152.
Davidson, D. (1963), “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, inEssays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 3–19.
Davidson, D. (1971), “Agency,” inEssays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 43–61.
Davidson, D. (1973). “Freedom to Act”, inEssays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 63–81.
Davidson, D. (1978), “Intending”, inEssays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 83–102.
Davidson, D. (1980),Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Dell, G.S. (1995), “Speaking and Misspeaking,” in D.N. Osherson (ed.),An Invitation to Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 183–208.
Flew, A., ed. (1951),Essays on Logic and Language, Blackwell, Oxford
Frankfurt, H.G. (1978), “The Problem of Action,” inThe Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 69–79.
Frankfurt, H.G. (1988),The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
French, P.A., T.E. Uehling, Jr., and H.K. Wettstein, eds. (1986),Studies in the Philosophy of Mind: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. X, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Ginet, C. (1990),On Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hart, H.L.A. (1951), “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights”, in A. Flew (ed.),Essays on Logic and Language, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 145–166.
Hornsby, J. (1980),Actions, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Hornsby, J. (1993), “On What's Intentionally Done”, in S. Shute, J. Gardner and J. Horder (eds.),Action and Value in Criminal Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 55–74.
Hornsby, J. (1997),Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Houlgate, L.D. (1966), “Mistake in Performance,”Mind 75, 257–261.
Hunter, J.F.M. (1987), “Trying”,Philosophical Quarterly 37, 392–401.
Hursthouse, R. (1991), “Arational Actions”,Journal of Philosophy 88, 57–68.
James, W. (1890/1983),The Principles of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Jones, O.R. (1983) “Trying”,Mind 92, 368–385.
McCann, H.J. (1986), “Rationality and the Range of Intention”, in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr. and H.K. Wettstein (eds.),Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 191–211.
McCann, H. (1974), “Volition and Basic Action”,Philosophical Review 83, 451–473.
Mele, A.R. (1988), “Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, 723–731.
Mele, A.R. (1992),Springs of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Norman, D.A. (1981), “Categorization of Action Slips,rdPsychological Review 88, 1–15.
O'Shaughnessy, B. (1973), “Trying (as the Mental ‘Pineal Gland’),”Journal of Philosophy 70, 365–386.
Osherson, D.N., ed. (1995),An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Volume 1: Language, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Paprzycka, K., (1997),Social Anatomy of Action. Toward a Responsibility-Based Conception of Agency, Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh.
Paprzycka, K. (2002), “False Consciousness of Intentional Psychology’,Philosophical Psychology 15, 271–295.
Prichard, H.A. (1945), “Acting, Willing, Desiring”, in A.R. White (ed.),The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 59–69.
Searle, J.R. (1983),Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Shute, S., J. Gardner, and J. Horder, eds. (1993),Action and Value in Criminal Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Smith, M. (1987), “The Humean Theory of Motivation,”Mind 96, 36–61.
Smith, H. (1994),The Moral Problem, Blackwell, Oxford.
Soles, D.H. (1982), “Some Ways of Going Wrong: On Mistakes in ‘On Certainty’”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42, 555–571.
Tomberlin, J.E., ed. (1989),Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, CA.
White, A.R., ed. (1968),The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Wilson, G.M. (1989),The Intentionality of Human Action, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Peabody, K. Trying slips: Can davidson and hornsby account for mistakes and slips?. Philosophia 33, 173–216 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02652652
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02652652