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Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency

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Abstract

A unanimously adopted democratic constitution is a contract between the people as principal and the government as agent. However, none of the incentive devices employed in private principal-agent contracting assure enforcement of a constitution. Under majority voting, candidates for the job of agent cannot win the job without promising tobreak the contract, and the agent cannot be re-elected unless he keeps that promise.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Finance, School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, 75080, Richardson, Texas, USA

    Larry J. Merville (Professor) & Dale K. Osborne (Professor)

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  1. Larry J. Merville
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  2. Dale K. Osborne
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We thank Joseph Haslag for his comments and Beverly Young for her valuable assistance.

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Merville, L.J., Osborne, D.K. Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency. Constit Polit Econ 1, 21–47 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393239

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