Abstract
In a post-constitutional context, restructuring of constitutional rights often fundamentally alters the role and scope of government. It is therefore important to assess the extent to which consensuality is likely to characterize the process of constitutional revision. This article provides theoretical and empirical grounds for concluding that nonconsensual constitutional revision is often the rule rather than the exception. The endogeneity of politically relevant transaction costs and their manipulation by self-interested political actors in a post-constitutional environment are central to the analysis.
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I wish to thank Robert Higgs and this journal's referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Twight, C. Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision. Constit Polit Econ 3, 89–112 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393234
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393234