Leviathan: Revenue-maximizer or glory-seeker?

Abstract

We argue that the Hobbesian assumption of glory-seeking behavior, especially when applied to holders of high office, is both more realistic and has greater predictive power than Brennan and Buchanan's hypothesis of revenue-maximization. Whereas traditional public finance theory sees the sovereign as a benign agent without an objective of his own and Brennan and Buchanan endow him with the objective of revenue maximization, Hobbes's political construct envisages a sovereign-principal who devises rules and incentives to induce his subjects-agents to contribute to his own preservation and glory. We examine the implications of this Copernican revolution in public finance theory by referring to Brennan and Buchanan's key claim that the Leviathan ought to be constrained by a fiscal constitution. We argue that the interplay of the pursuit glory and the concern for self-preservation implies that the government cannot be bound by rules set by citizens.