Skip to main content
Log in

Abstract

This article evaluates economic theories of the non-profit sector by their ability to enlighten our understanding of the scope of inquiry, the determinants of the size and scope of the non-profit sector, and the behavioural responses of donors, volunteers, paid staff and non-profit organisations to changes in their external environment. Adherence to a non-distribution constraint has proven to be a useful way of delimiting economic analysis of non-profit organisations, but more attention should be paid to alternatives. Economists have been less successful at developing usable distinctions between voluntary action and exchange. The size and scope of the sector appear to be determined by entrepreneurial supply factors, donations (which in turn are influenced by tax policy, governmental spending, fund-raising, and the quality and mixture of organisational outputs, commercial or charitable), commercial activities, capital supply, the supply of labour (paid and volunteered), the marketability of outputs, and the distribution of consumer characteristics. Variations of James's (1983) model have proven useful to predict the reaction of non-profits to exogenous changes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments,Journal of Public Economics, 35, 291–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreoni, J. (1989) Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence,Journal of Political Economy, 97, 6, 1447–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreoni, J. (1993) An experimental test of the public goods crowding-out hypothesis,American Economic Review, 83, 1317–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K.J. (1974) Gifts and exchanges,Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 343–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith, D. and Jenkins, S. (1985) A multiperiod model of nonprofit enterprise,Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 32, 119–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Auten, G.E. and Rudney, G. (1990) The variability of individual charitable giving in the US,Voluntas, 1, 2, 80–97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Auten, G.E., Cilke, J.M. and Randolph, W.C. (1992) The effects of tax reform on charitable contributions,National Tax Journal, 45, 267–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bagnoli, M. and McKee, M. (1991) Voluntary contribution games: efficient private provision of public goods,Economic Inquiry, 29, 351–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, K.S. (1991) Panel-data estimates of charitable giving: a synthesis of techniques,National Tax Journal, 44, 365–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, K.S. and McGuirk, A. (1992) Charitable giving and federal income tax policy. Additional evidence based on panel-data elasticity estimates: the case of the student's T distribution. Paper presented at 1992 annual conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, New Haven, Connecticut.

  • Barrett, K., McGuirk, A. and Steinberg, R. (1997) Further evidence on the dynamic effects of taxes on giving,National Tax Journal, 50, 2, forthcoming.

  • Becker, E. and Lindsay, C.M. (1994) Does the government free ride?Journal of Law and Economics, 37, 1, 277–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ben-Ner, A. (1986) Nonprofit organizations: why do they exist in market economies?, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.)The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ben-Ner, A. (1987) Birth, change, and bureaucratization in nonprofit organizations: an economic analysis, Working paper, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ben-Ner, A. and Van Hoomissen, T. (1991) Nonprofits in the mixed economy: a demand and supply analysis,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 62, 519–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Billis, D. (1993)Organising Public and Voluntary Agencies, Routledge, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilodeau, M. and Slivinski, A. (1995a) Rational nonprofit entrepreneurship, Working paper, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, London, Ontario.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilodeau, M. and Slivinski, A. (1995b) Rival nonprofit firms, Working paper, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, London, Ontario.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilodeau, M. and Slivinski, A. (1995c) Profitable nonprofit firms, Paper presented at ARNOVA annual conference, Cleveland, Ohio.

  • Borjas, G.J., Frech III, H.E. and Ginsburg, P.B. (1983) Property rights and wages: the case of nursing homes,Journal of Human Resources, 17, 231–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boulding, K. (1972)Towards a Pure Theory of Foundations, Nonprofit Report, New York.

  • Bradley, R. and McClelland, R. (1997) A robust estimation of the effects of taxation on charitable contributions, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

  • Bristol, R.B. (1985) Tax cuts and charitable giving,Tax Notes, 15 July, 323–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, E. and Lankford, R.H. (1992) Gifts of money and gifts of time: estimating the effects of tax prices and available time,Journal of Public Economics, 47, 321.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, C.F. and Tuckman, H.P. (1990) Do higher tax rates increase the market share of nonprofit hospitals?National Tax Journal, 43, 175–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, C.F. and Tuckman, H.P. (1991a) A methodology for measuring the financial vulnerability of charitable nonprofit organizations,Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 20, 445–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, C.F. and Tuckman, H.P. (1991b) Financial vulnerability and attrition as measures of nonprofit performance,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 62, 4, 655–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chillemi, O. and Gui, B. (1990) Product quality in trust type nonprofits: an expository evaluation of three economic models, inTowards the 21st Century: Challenges for the Voluntary Sector (Proceedings of the 1990 AVAS Conference). London.

  • Chillemi, O. and Gui, B. (1991) Uninformed customers and nonprofit organization: modelling ‘contract failure’ theory,Economics Letters, 35, 5–8.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clotfelter, C.T. (1985)Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R.H. (1937) The nature of the firm,Economica, 386–405.

  • Collard, D. (1978)Altruism and Economy. A Study in Non-Selfish Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colliton, J.W. (1980) The meaning of ‘contribution or gift’ for charitable contribution deduction purposes,Ohio State Law Journal, 41.

  • Colombo, J.D. and Hall, M.A. (1995)The Charitable Tax Exemption, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conrad, D. (1986) Returns on equity for not-for-profit hospitals: a commentary and elaboration,Health Services Research, 21, 17–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1984) Easy riders, joint production, and public goods,Economic Journal, 94, 580–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davie, B.F. (1985) Tax rate changes and charitable contributions.Tax Notes, 11 March, 1037–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, D.D. and Holt, C.A. (1992)Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

    Google Scholar 

  • Day, K.M. and Devlin, R.A. (1996) Volunteerism and crowding out: Canadian econometric evidence,Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 1, 37–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doyle, M.P. (1992) New evidence on private charity: accounting for the effect of religious affiliation, Working paper, Department of Economics, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duncombe, W. and Brudney, J. (1992) Volunteer demand and the optimal mix of volunteer and paid staff in local governments, Paper presented at the annual ARNOVA conference, New Haven, Connecticut.

  • Easley, D. and O'Hara, M. (1983) The economic role of nonprofit firms,Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 3, 531–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckel, C.C. and Steinberg, R. (1993) Competition, performance and public policy towards nonprofits, in D.C. Hammack and D.R. Young (eds)Nonprofit Organizations in a Market Economy: Understanding New Roles, Issues, and Trends, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckel, C.C. and Steinberg, R. (1994) Tax policy and the objectives of nonprofit organizations in a mixed-sector duopoly, Working paper, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, Indiana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigenbaum, S. (1980) The case of income redistribution: a theory of government and private provision of collective goods,Public Finance Quarterly, 8, 3–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feldstein, M. (1971) Hospital cost inflation: a study in nonprofit price dynamics,American Economic Review, 61, 853–872.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferris, J. and Graddy, E. (1991) Production costs, transaction costs, and local government contractor choice,Economic Inquiry, 29, 541–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Folland, S. (1990) Nonprofit entry: a theory and an empirical test for the case of hospitals, Working paper, School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Oakland, Minnesota.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frischmann, P.J. and Lin, S. (1990) Fixed and random effects models: two methods to improve parameter estimates using panel data, Working paper, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goddeeris, J. (1988) Compensating differentials and self-selection: an application to lawyers,Journal of Political Economy, 96, 411–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodspeed, T. and Kenyon, D. (1994) The nonprofit sector's capital constraint: does it provide a rationale for the tax-exemption granted to nonprofit firms?Public Finance Quarterly, 22.

  • Grønbjerg, K. (1990) Managing nonprofit funding relationships: case studies of six human service organizations, Working paper 156, Program on Nonprofit Organizations, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grønbjerg, K. (1993)Understanding Nonprofit Funding, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gui, B. (1990) Nonprofit organizations and product quality under asymmetric information, Working paper, Department of Economics and Statistics, Trieste University, Trieste, Italy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gulley, O.D. and Santerre, R.E. (1993) The effect of tax exemption on the market share of nonprofit hospitals,National Tax Journal, 46, 477–86.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guttman, J.M. (1986) Matching behavior and collective action: some experimental evidence,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7, 171–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Handy, F. (1995) Co-existence of nonprofits, for-profits and public sector institutions. Paper presented at 1995 ARNOVA conference, Cleveland, Ohio.

  • Hansmann, H. (1980) The role of nonprofit enterprise,Yale Law Journal, 89, 3, 835–901.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. (1981a) Nonprofit enterprise in the performing arts,Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 341–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. (1981b) The rationale for exempting nonprofit organizations from the corporate income tax,Yale Law Journal, 91, 54–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. (1981c) Reforming nonprofit corporation law,University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 129, 497–623.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. (1987a) The effect of tax exemption and other factors on the market share of nonprofit versus for-profit firms,National Tax Journal, 40, 71–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. (1987b) Economic theories of nonprofit organization, in W.W. Powell (ed.)The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. (1990) Why do universities have endowments?,Journal of Legal Studies, 19, 3–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hey, J.D. (1991)Experiments in Economics, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirth, R.A. (1995) Consumer information and ownership in the nursing home industry, Working paper, University of Michigan, Department of Economics, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holtmann, A.G. (1983) A theory of non-profit firms,Economica, 50, 439–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holtmann, A.G. and Ullmann, S.G. (1991) Transaction costs, uncertainty, and not-for-profit organizations: the case of nursing homes,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 62, 4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Isaac, R.M. and Walker, J.M. (1988) Group size effects in public good provision: the voluntary contributions mechanism,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 53, 179–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs, P. and Wilder, R.P. (1984) Pricing behavior of non-profit agencies: the case of blood products,Journal of Health Economics, 3, 49–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • James, E. (1983) How nonprofits grow: a model,Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2, 350–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • James, E. (1986) Comment, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.)The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, E. (1989) Introduction, in E. James (ed.)The Nonprofit Sector in International Perspective: Studies in Comparative Culture and Policy, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufman, D.A. (1991) Self-serving philanthropy and pareto optimality,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 62, 4, 573–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khanna, J., Posnett, J. and Sandler, T. (1995) Charity donations in the UK: new evidence based on panel data,Journal of Public Economics, 56, 2, 257–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiesling, L.L. (1995) Moral sentiments and reputation capital in charitable giving: institutional change and the role of information in Victorian Lancashire, Working paper, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingma, B.R. (1993) Portfolio theory and nonprofit financial stability,Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22, 105–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kingma, B.R. (1995) Do profits ‘crowd out’ donations, or vice versa? The impact of revenues from sales on donations to local chapters of the American Red Cross,Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 6, 21–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kingma, B.R. and McClelland, R. (1995) Public radio stations are really, really not public goods: charitable contributions and impure altruism,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 66, 1, 65–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krashinsky, M. (1986) Transactions costs and a theory of the nonprofit organization, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.)The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lankford, R.H. and Wyckoff, J.H. (1991) Modeling charitable giving using a Box-Cox standard tobit model,The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 460–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard, J.O. (1995) Public goods: a survey of experimental research, in J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth (eds)The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leete, L. (1994) The nonprofit wage differential in the US: new estimates from the 1990 Census, Working paper, Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindahl, W.E. (1991) Differentiating planned and major gift prospects,American Prospect Research Association, Fall.

  • Lindahl, W.E. (1995) The major gift donor relationship: an analysis of donors and contributions,Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 5, 411–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lindahl, W.E. and Winship, C. (1992) Predictive models for annual fundraising and major gift fundraising,Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 3, 43–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lindahl, W.E. and Winship, C. (1994) A logit model with interactions for predicting major gift donors,Research in Higher Education, 35, 729–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McClelland, R. and Kokoski, M. (1994) Econometric issues in the analysis of charitable giving,Public Finance Quarterly, 22, 498–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGregor-Lowndes, M. (1992) Comparative legal structures of nonprofit organisations, Paper presented at Third International Conference on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, Indiana.

  • Margolis, H. (1982)Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality, Cambridge University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mark, M.M. and Shotland, R.L. (1983) Increasing charitable contributions: an experimental evaluation of the American Cancer Society's recommended solicitation procedures,Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 12, 2, 8–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marks, M. (1993) The effect of alternative rebate rules and preference strength in the provision point mechanism of voluntary contributions: an experimental investigation, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marwell, G. and Ames, R.E. (1980) Experiments on the provision of public goods II: Provision points, stakes, experience, and the free-rider problem,American Journal of Sociology, 85, 927–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marwell, G. and Ames, R.E. (1981) Economists free ride: does anyone else?Journal of Public Economics, 15, 295–310.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mauser, E. (1993) Is organizational form important to consumers and managers: an application to the day-care industry, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Economics, University of Wisconsin at Madison Madison, Wisconsin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menchik, P. and Weisbrod, B. (1987) Volunteer labor supply,Journal of Public Economics, 32, 159–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mohr, J. (1995) The impact of state intervention in the nonprofit sector: the case of the new deal, Paper presented at ARNOVA annual conference, Cleveland, Ohio.

  • Morgan, J. and Sefton, M. (1996) Funding public goods with lotteries: an experiment, Working paper, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics, State College, Pennsylvania.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, M. (1975) Economic determinants of volunteer work by women,Signs: Journal of Women and Culture in Society, 1, 325–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Newhouse, J.P. (1970) Toward a theory of nonprofit institutions: an economic model of a hospital,American Economic Review, 60, 2, 64–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Okunade, A. (1994) Determinants of charitable giving of business school alumni, Working paper, Department of Economics, Memphis University, Memphis, Tennessee.

    Google Scholar 

  • Okunade, A., Wunnava, P.V. and Walsh Jr., R. (1994) Charitable giving of alumni: microdata evidence from a large public university,The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53, 73–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O'Neil, C.J., Steinberg, R. and Thompson, G.R. (1996) Reassessing the tax-favored status of the charitable deduction for gifts of appreciated assets,National Tax Journal, 49, 2, 215–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oster, S.M. (1992) Nonprofit organizations as franchise operations,Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 2, 3, 223–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pauly, M. (1987) Paying a return on equity to not-for-profit hospitals-some further thoughts,Health Services Research, 22, 2, 271–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posnett, J. and Sandler, T. (1986) Joint supply and the finance of charitable activity,Public Finance Quarterly, 14, 209–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posnett, J. and Sandler, T. (1989) Demand for charity donations in private non-profit markets: the case of the UK,Journal of Public Economics, 40, 2, 187–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Preston, A.E. (1988a) The nonprofit firm: a potential solution to inherent market failures,Economic Inquiry, 26, 493–506.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Preston, A.E. (1988b) The effects of property rights on labor costs of nonprofit firms: an application to the day care industry,Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, 337–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Preston, A.E. (1989) The nonprofit worker in a for-profit world,Journal of Labor Economics, 7, 4, 438–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Preston, A.E. (1992) Entrepreneurial self-selection into the nonprofit sector: effects on motivations and efficiency, Working paper, W. Averell Harriman School for Management and Policy, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Randolph, W.C. (1995) Dynamic income, progressive taxes, and the timing of charitable contributions,Journal of Political Economy, 103, 4, 709–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J., Ullrich, R. and Nelson Jr. O. (1975) A comparison of managers entering or reentering the profit and nonprofit sectors,Academy of Management Journal, 18, 616–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ribar, D.C. and Wilhelm, M.O. (1995) Charitable contributions to international relief and development,National Tax Journal, 48, 2, 229–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricketts, R.C. and Westfall, P.H. (1993) New evidence on the price elasticity of charitable contributions,Journal of the American Taxation Association, 15, 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roomkin, M. and Weisbrod, B. (1994) Managerial compensation in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals: is there a difference? Working paper, Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1981) Do government grants to charity reduce private donations?, in M. White (ed.)Nonprofit Firms in a Three-Sector Economy, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1987) Ideals versus dollars: donors, charity managers, and government grants,Journal of Political Economy, 95, 4, 810–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salamon, L.M. (1987) Of market failure, voluntary failure, and third-party government: toward a theory of government-nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state,Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 16, 29–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salamon, L.M. and Anheier, H.K. (1992) In search of the nonprofit sector: the question of definitions,Voluntas, 3, 2, 125–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, P. (1947)Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiff, J. (1985) Does government spending crowd out charitable contributions?,National Tax Journal, 38, 535–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiff, J. (1990)Charitable giving and Government Policy: An Economic Analysis, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiff, J. and Steinberg, R. (1988) The effect of federal government expenditure cutbacks on service provision by states and nonprofit organizations, Working paper, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Blacksburg, Virginia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiff, J. and Weisbrod, B. (1991) Competition between for-profit and nonprofit organizations in commercial markets,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 62, 4, 619–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schlesinger, M. (1985) Economic models of nonprofit organizations: a reappraisal of the property rights approach, Working paper, JFK School, Harvard University.

  • Sefton, M. and Steinberg, R. (1996) Reward structures in public goods experiments,Journal of Public Economics, 58, 263–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spiegel, M. (1995) Charity without altruism,Economic Inquiry, 33, 4, 625–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1986) Should donors care about fund raising?, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.)The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy. Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1987a) Voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system,American Economic Review, 77, 24–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1987b) Nonprofit organisations and the market, in W.W. Powell (ed.)The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1990a) Profits and incentive compensation in nonprofit firms,Nonprofit Management and Leadership 1, 2, 137–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1990b) Taxes and giving: new findings,Voluntas, 1, 2, 61–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1991a) Does government spending crowd out donations? Interpreting the evidence,Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 62, 4, 591–618.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1991b) The economics of fundraising, in D. Burlingame and M. Hulse (eds)Taking Fund Raising Seriously, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1993) Public policy and the performance of nonprofit organizations: a general framework,Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22, 1, 13–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1994) United Cancer Council v. Commissioner of the IRS and the indirect regulation of fundraising, Working paper, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, Indiana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. (1995) What the numbers say,Advancing Philanthropy, 3, 2, 26–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. and Eckel, C.C. (1995) A deeper look at the tax preferences given nonprofit organizations, Working paper, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, Indiana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. and Gray, B.H. (1993) ‘The role of nonprofit enterprise’ in 1992: Hansmann revisited,Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22, 297–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, R. and Weisbrod, B.A. (1996) To give or to sell? That is the question: or, … price discrimination by nonprofit organizations with distributional objectives, Working paper, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, Indianapolis, Indiana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinwald, B. and Neuhauser, D. (1970) The role of the proprietary hospital,Law and Contemporary Problems, 35, 817–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toolson, R.B. (1990) The charitable contribution deduction: new evidence of a strong incentive effect,Advances in Taxation, 2, 107–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuckman, H.P. and Chang, C.F. (1992) Nonprofit equity: a behavioral model and its policy implications,Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11, 1, 76–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1966) Information without profit,Papers on Non-Market Decisionmaking, 1, 141–59.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weisbrod, B.A. (1975) Toward a theory of the voluntary nonprofit sector in a three-sector economy, in E.S. Phelps (ed.)Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weisbrod, B.A. (1983) Non-profit and proprietary sector behavior: wage differentials among lawyers,Journal of Labor Economics, 1, 3, 246–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisbrod, B.A. (1988)The Nonprofit Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weisbrod, B.A. and Schlesinger, M. (1986) Public, private, nonprofit ownership and the response to asymmetric information: the case of nursing homes, in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.)The Nonprofit Sector: Economic Theory and Public Policy. Oxford University Press, Fairlawn, New Jersey.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winkle, C. (1990) Supply-side theory of the role of the nonprofit sector: an analysis of two case studies, Working paper, School of Urban Planning and Policy, University of Illinois-Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolff, N., Weisbrod, B. and Bird, E. (1993) The supply of volunteer labor: the case of hospitals,Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 4, 1, 23–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wolpert, J. (1977) Social income and the voluntary sector,Papers, Regional Science Association, 39, 217–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yamauchi, N. (1994) Taxation and charitable contributions in Japan, Paper presented at ISTR biennial conference, Pecs, Hungary.

  • Young, D.R. (1983)If Not For Profit, For What?, DC Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, D.R. (1989) Local autonomy in afranchise age: structural change in national voluntary associations,Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 18, 101–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, D.R. and Steinberg, R. (1995)Economics for Nonprofit Managers, The Foundation Center Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, D.R., Standley, A.P. and Hiedemann, S. (1995) Structural variation and change in national nonprofit associations: case studies in social services and health charities, Paper presented at the 1995 ARNOVA conference, Cleveland Ohio.

  • Ziliak, S.T. (1996) The contradiction of compassion: private charity and the ‘solution’ to dependence. Paper presented at the Allied Social Science Association Meetings, San Francisco, California.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

I thank Symposium participants, especially Mark Schlesinger, Paul DiMaggio, Anne Preston, Avner Ben-Ner and Helmut Anheier for helpful suggestions.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Steinberg, R. Overall evaluation of economic theories. Voluntas 8, 179–204 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02354194

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02354194

Keywords

Navigation