Abstract
This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better outcome for himself by misrepresenting his preference, while his partner can, this player will find that possessing a monopoly of information will not give him any special advantage. In fact, this analysis demonstrates that he may have incentives to share his information selectively with one or another of his opponents should he alone possess complete information at the outset.
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Brams, S.J., Zagare, F.C. Double deception: Two against one in three-person games. Theor Decis 13, 81–90 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02342605
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02342605