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Self-referential justification

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Notes

  1. H. Feigl, “De Principiis Non Disputandum,”Philosophical Analysis, ed. by M. Black (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950) and “Validation and Vindication,”Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. by Sellars and Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952).

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  2. I take this usage from F. B. Fitch, “Self-Reference in Philosophy,”Mind, 55:64–73 (1946); reprinted as appendix C in hisSymbolic Logic (New York: Ronald Press, 1952). I owe the idea of self-referential justification to this essay.

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  3. Mind, 62:289–300 (1953).

  4. Ibid., p. 291.

  5. Mind, p. 291.

  6. Mind, 62:292 (1953).

  7. Ibid., p. 292.

  8. Review of Metaphysics, 6:203, 205 (1952).

  9. This definition is adapted from Fitch; cf.Symbolic Logic, p. 219.

  10. “On the Self-Reference of a Meaning Theory,” {jtPhilosophical Studies}, 4:69–70 (1953).

  11. Ledger Wood,The Analysis of Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), pp. 193–203.

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  1. Oberlin College, USA

    Paul F. Schmidt

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  1. Paul F. Schmidt
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Schmidt, P.F. Self-referential justification. Philos Stud 8, 49–54 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02308564

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