This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
F. Gjesdal, “Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes,”Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90, 3, September 1988.
S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart, “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,”Econometrica, 51, 1, January 1983.
M. Harris and A. Raviv, “Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Application to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement,”American Economic Review, 68, 1, March 1978.
M. Harris and A. Raviv, “Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information,”Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 2, April 1979.
B. Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard and Observability,”Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1, Spring 1979.
G. M. MacDonald, “New Directions in the Economic Theory of Agency,”Canadian Journal of Economics, 17, 3, August 1984.
W. P. Rogerson, “The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems,”Econometrica, 53, 6, November 1985.
S. Shavell, “Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship,”Bell Journal Of Economics, 10, 1, Spring 1979.
J. E. Stiglitz, “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping,”Review of Economic Studies, 41, 2, April 1974.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Comments and suggestions by R. C. Kumar, K. R. Stollery, and an anonymous referee of this journal are appreciated.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Androkovich, R.A. Relative risk aversion, incentive effects, and risk sharing. Atlantic Economic Journal 18, 38–41 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02299017
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02299017