Abstract
In this study, it is hypothesized that higher (rising) real PAC election campaign contributions may lead the public to increasingly distrust and resent politicians because of the perceived political influence that these contributions exercise. It is further hypothesized that to express that distrust and resentment, the public may make greater efforts to evade income taxation so as to deny tax revenues to the Treasury and “influence-peddling” politicians. Instrumenatal Variable (IV) estimates in first differences that allow for income tax rates, IRS audit rates, IRS penalty assessments on detected unreported income, and the public's dissatisfaction with government per se, find strong, albeit only preliminary, empirical evidence that tax evasion is an increasing function of real PAC election campaign contributions.
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The author is indebted to Jim Alm, Mike McKee, Joel Slemrod, and Thomas Stratmann and to the University of Miami Economics Seminar faculty and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas Economics Seminar faculty for ideas and helpful comments.
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Cebula, R.J. Tax evasion as ade facto vote of disapproval of PAC contributions. Atlantic Economic Journal 31, 338–347 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298492
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298492