Abstract
We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for two person non-zero sum repeated games with lack of information on one side and two states of nature.
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A first version of this paper was written in June 1980 at the Institute for Advanced Studies (Jerusalem). I am greatly indebted to S. Zamir for very stimulating discussions on this subject.
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Sorin, S. Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 12, 193–205 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769090
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769090