Abstract
Non-symmetric generalizations of the non-transferable utility (NTU) are defined and characterized axiomatically. The first of these is a weighted NTU value that is identical to the (symmetric) NTU value when players have the same weights. On the class of transferable utility games, this weighted NTU value coincides with the weighted Shapley value and on the pure bargaining games it coincides with the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution. A further extension, the random order NTU value, is also defined and axiomatized and its relationship to the core is discussed.
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Levy, A., McLean, R.P. An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value. Int J Game Theory 19, 339–351 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766425
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766425