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Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games

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Abstract

We examine behavior of the core and value of certain classes of cooperative games in which a dynamic aspect is introduced. New players are added to the games while the underlying structure is held constant. This is done by considering games that satisfy properties like convexity, or games that are derived from optimization problems in which a player's addition can be defined naturally. For such games we give conditions regarding monotonicity of the core and value.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management Science and Operations Management, School of Business and Management, Temple University, 19122, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    E. C. Rosenthal

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  1. E. C. Rosenthal
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Rosenthal, E.C. Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games. Int J Game Theory 19, 45–57 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753707

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753707

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