Abstract
The purpose of this article is to extend the results of J. F.Mertens and S.Zamir, The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Lack of Information on Both Sides (Intern. Journal of Game Theory,1, 39–64, 1971) to the case where both players are not necessarily informed of each other's pure strategy choices at each stage.
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Mertens, J. F., and S.Zamir: The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides. Research Program in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Research Memorandum No. 61, Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. July 1970. (A modified version appeared in Intern. Journal of Game Theory1, 39–64, 1971.)
Walkup, D. W., andR. J. B. Wets: A Lipschitzian characterization of convex polyhedra. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc.23, 167–173, 1969.
S.Zamir: On the value of a finitely repeated game of incomplete information with a general information function. Research Program in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Research Memorandum No. 46, Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, May 1969.
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Mertens, J.F. The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games the extensive case. Int J Game Theory 1, 217–227 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753446
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753446