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Some limitations of demand revelaing processes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Northwestern University, USA

    Theodore Groves (Professor of Managerial Economics)

Authors
  1. Theodore Groves
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  2. John O. Ledyard
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This work was financed by National Science Foundation Grant No. SOC 74-04076.

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Groves, T., Ledyard, J.O. Some limitations of demand revelaing processes. Public Choice 29 (Suppl 2), 107–124 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718520

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