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A symmetrization for finite two-person games

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Abstract

The symmetrization method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker for matrix games is extended for bimatrix games. It is shown that the equilibria of a bimatrix game and its symmetrization correspond two by two. A similar result is found with respect to quasi-strong, regular and perfect equilibria.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Mathematics/NICI, University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld, 6525, ED Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    A. P. Jurg, M. J. M. Jansen, J. A. M. Potters & S. H. Tijs

  2. Open University, Heerlen

    M. J. M. Jansen

Authors
  1. A. P. Jurg
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  2. M. J. M. Jansen
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  3. J. A. M. Potters
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  4. S. H. Tijs
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Jurg, A.P., Jansen, M.J.M., Potters, J.A.M. et al. A symmetrization for finite two-person games. ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research 36, 111–123 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01417212

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01417212

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