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Non-cooperative matching games

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Abstract

Consider a market in which two distinct groups of agents face each other. Every agent can improve upon his status quo if he is matched with a member of the opposite group and if he agrees with his partner how to split the realized gain. The paper presents two non-cooperative games in which the agents construct the allocation without the help of an auctioneer. In the first game the set of equilibria coincides with the cooperative “stable solutions” which are well-established in this context. In the second game it is shown that a change of the order of the moves is sufficient to arrive at a unique equilibrium payoff.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Universität Bonn, Adenauerallee 24, 53 Bonn 1

    U. Kamecke

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  1. U. Kamecke
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Kamecke, U. Non-cooperative matching games. Int J Game Theory 18, 423–431 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01358802

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01358802

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