Abstract
Legal scholars have long recognized the significance of strategic behavior when considering how legal rules affect, individuals. In the principal applications of game theory to the law, legal rules have been analyzed as corrective devices for game inefficiencies. Law promotes what individuals cannot spontaneously achieve or helps them avoid the traps of strategic social interaction. The logic of this argument, however, needs to be reversed if one wishes to use game theory to explain the spontaneous emergence of law. The challenge is to apply the sophisticated tools of game theory to an appraisal of spontaneous sources of law and to consider the incentive structure of the originating environment as well as the possible role of strategic behavior in affecting the equilibrium outcome.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Alchian A. A. (1950) “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory.”Journal of Political Economy 58: 211–21.
Axelrod, R. M. (1981) “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists.”American Political Science Review 75: 306.
Axelrod, R. M. (1984)The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Benson, B. L. (1988) “Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies.”,Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144: 772–88.
Benson, B. L. (1989) “The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law.”Southern Economic Journal 55: 644–61.
Benson, B. L. (1990)The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute.
Benson, B. L. (1992) “Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law”.Constitutional Political Economy 3: 1.
Berman, H. J., and Dasser, F. J. (1990) “The ‘New’ Law Merchant and the ‘Old’: Sources, Content, and Legitimacy.” In: Carbonneau, T. E. (ed.)Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Juris Publications.
Binmore, K., and Samuelson, L. (1994) “An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 150: 45–63.
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (1992) “Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups.”Ethology and Sociobiology 13: 171–95.
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (1994) “The Evolution of Norms: An Anthropological View.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 72–86.
Buchanan, J. M. (1975)The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1979) “General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics.” In:What Should Economists Do? Liberty Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1991) “The Foundations for Normative Individualism.” In:The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1994) “Choosing What to Choose.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 123–35.
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962)The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Charney, J. I. (1986) “The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law.”British Yearbook of International Law 56: 1.
Cooter, R. D. (1992) “Against Legal Centrism.”California Law Review 81: 425.
Cooter, R. D. (1994) “Structural Adjudication, and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law.”International Review of Law and Economics 14: 215–27.
D'Amato, A. (1971)The Concept of Custom in International Law. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
David, R. (1984)International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (vol. 2), New York: Oceana.
Eisenberg, M. A. (1988)The Nature of the Common Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ellickson, R. C. (1991)Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
Ellickson, R. C. (1994) “The Aim of Order Without Law.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 97–100.
Fudenberg, D., and Maskin, E. (1986) “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information.”Econometrica 54: 533–54.
Fuller, L. L. (1969)The Morality of Law. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gauthier, D. (1986)Morals by Agreement Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Greif, A. (1989) “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders.”Journal of Economic History 49: 857.
Hardin, G. (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons.”Science 162: 1243.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1955) “Cardinal Welfare Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.”Journal of Political Economy 63: 315.
hart, H. L. A. (1961)The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1955)The Counterrevolution of Science. New York: Free Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1960)The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1967) “The Results of Human Action But Not of Human Design.” In:Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1989)The Fatal Conceit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hirshleifer, J. (1982) “Evolutionary Models in Economics and the Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies.”Research in Law and Economics 4: 1.
Janis, M. W. (1993)An Introduction to International law. New York: Little Brown.
Kelsen H. (1939) “Théorie du Droit International Coutumier.”Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit (New Series) 1: 263.
Kelsen, H. (1945)General Theory of Law and the State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kelsen, H. (1952)Principles of International Law New York: Rinehart.
Klein, B., and Leffler, K. (1981) “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.”Jounal of Political Economy 89: 615–41.
Kronman, A. (1985) “Contract Law and the State of Nature.”Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 5.
Leibenstein, H. (1982) “The Prisoners', Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of Intrafirm Productivity.”AEA Papers and Proceedings 72: 92.
Levy, D. (1988) “Utility-Enhancing Consumption Constraints.”Economics and Philosophy 4: 69–88.
Levy, D. (1992) “Adam Smith and the Texas A&M Rats.” In:The Economic Ideas of Ordinary People: From Preferences to Trade. New York: Routledge.
Lewis, D. (1969)Convention: A Philosophical, Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, University Press.
Mateesco, N. M. (1947)La Coutume dans les Cycles Juridiques Internationaux. Paris: A. Pedone.
Muris, T. J. (1981) “Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts.”,Minnesota Law Review 65: 521.
Parisi, F. (1996) “Law, as a Voluntary Enterprise.” In: Ratnapala, S., and Moens, G. (eds.)The Jurisprudence of Liberty. Butterworth.
Pollock, F. (1929)First Book of Jurisprudence (6th ed.) London: Macmillan.
Rapoport, A. (1987) “Prisoner's Dilemma.” In:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. New York: Norton.
Rawls, J. (1971)A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ress, G. (1994) “Ex Ante Safeguards Against Ex Post Opportunism in International Treaties: Theory and Practice of International Public Law.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 279–303.
Salmond, J. W. (1966)Jurisprudence (12th ed.). London: Sweet and Maxwell.
Schotter, A. (1981)Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scott, K. E. (1974) “Bounded Rationality and Social Norms.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 315–19.
Selten, R. (1978) “The Chain-Store Paradox.”Theory and Decision 9: 127–59.
Sen, A. K. (1979) “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.” In: Hahn, F., and Hollis, M. (eds.)Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shubik, M. (1987)Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions (4th ed.). Boston: MIT Press.
Smith, A. (1776)An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell.
Stearns, M. L. (1994) “The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice.”Yale Law Journal 103: 1219.
Straffin, P. (1980) “The Prisoner's Dilemma.”UMAP Journal 1: 101.
Trakman, L. E. (1983)The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law. Littleton, CO: Rotham.
Tucker, A. W. (1950) “A Two-Person Dilemma.” Unpublished manuscript reprinted in: Straffin, P. (1980) “The Prisoner's Dilemma,”UMAP Journal 1: 101.
Tullock, G. (1987)Private Wants, Public Means: An Economic Analysis of the Desirable Scope of Government. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Tunkin, G. I. (1961) “Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms in International Law.”California Law Review 49: 419.
Ulmann-Margalit, E. (1977)The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vanberg, V. J. (1993) “Rational Choice, Rule-Following and Institutions: An Evolutionary Perspective.” In: Gustafson, B., Knudsen, C., and Maki, U. (eds.)Rationality, Institutions and Economic Methodology (pp. 171–200). London: Routledge.
Vaughn, K. I. (1982) “Can Democratic Society Reform Itself: The Limits of Constructive Change.” George Mason University Working Paper.
Wagner, R. E. (1992) “Crafting Social Rules: Common Law vs. Statute Law, Once Again.”Constitutional Political Economy 3: 381.
Walden, R. M. (1977) “The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary International Law.”Israel Law Review 12: 344.
Weber, M. (1978)Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Williamson, O. (1983) “Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange.”American Economic Review 73: 519.
Wolfke, K. (1993)Custom in Present International Law (2d ed.). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Parisi, F. Toward a theory of spontaneous law. Constit Polit Econ 6, 211–231 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01303403
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01303403