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Unilaterally competitive games

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References

  • Aumann RJ (1961) Almost Strictly Competitive Games, Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 9, pp. 544–550.

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  • Friedman JW (1983) On Characterizing Equilibrium Points in Two Person Strictly Competitive Games, International Journal of Game Theory 12, pp. 245–247.

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  • Kats A, Thisse J-F (1993) Spatial Oligopolies With Uniform Delivered Pricing, in Does Economic Space Matter?, H Ohta and J-F Thisse (eds.), London, Macmillan (forthcoming).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    A. Kats

  2. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    J. -F. Thisse

  3. Universite de Paris I - Sorbonne, France

    J. -F. Thisse

Authors
  1. A. Kats
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  2. J. -F. Thisse
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Additional information

The authors acknowledge valuable discussions with Jonathan Hamilton and Mamoru Kaneko as well as very detailed comments of two referees.

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Kats, A., Thisse, J.F. Unilaterally competitive games. Int J Game Theory 21, 291–299 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258280

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258280

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