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Bargaining sets with small coalitions

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Abstract

We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies; the local bargaining by MasColell (1989) and the global bargaining set by Vind (1992). We alter these definitions to limit the size of the permitted size of the involved coalitions. It turns out that the local bargaining set becomes very large, whereas the global bargaining set is unaltered.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, University of Copenhagen, Universitetsparken 5, 2200, Copenhagen N, Denmark

    Ulla Schjødt

  2. Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, 1455, Copenhagen K, Denmark

    Birgitte Sloth

Authors
  1. Ulla Schjødt
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  2. Birgitte Sloth
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Additional information

The topic of this paper was suggested to us by Karl Vind during his lectures in “Mathematical Economics” at the Institute of Economics in Copenhagen. We would also like to thank Michael Maschler, Karl Vind and two annonymous referees for corrections and useful suggestions to earlier versions of this paper.

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Schjødt, U., Sloth, B. Bargaining sets with small coalitions. Int J Game Theory 23, 49–55 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242846

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242846

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