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Correlated equilibria and local interactions

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Summary

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, 19104, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    George J. Mailath

  2. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, 53706, Madison, Wisconsin, USA

    Larry Samuelson

  3. Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113, Bonn, Germany

    Avner Shaked

Authors
  1. George J. Mailath
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  2. Larry Samuelson
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  3. Avner Shaked
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Additional information

This work was done while George Mailath and Larry Samuelson were visiting the University of Bonn, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Ken Binmore for helpful discussions. This is a revision of Section 2 of Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked [6]. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn, is gratefully acknowledged.

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Mailath, G.J., Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A. Correlated equilibria and local interactions. Econ Theory 9, 551–556 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213855

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213855

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