Abstract
This paper discusses the role of the organizational structure in shaping the organizational learning process. Learning is modelled by means of a computational model in which search takes place in the space of problem representations and cannot be reduced to mere probability updating within a given and constant representation.
When the assumption of a unique and given representation of the problem is dropped, organizational learning emerges from the coordination of individual learning processes. Some simulations analyze the performance, in different environmental conditions, of centralized and decentralized coordination modes.
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Marengo, L. Coordination and organizational learning in the firm. J Evol Econ 2, 313–326 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01200129
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01200129