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Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules

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Abstract

Previous research has developed a representation for the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and negative plurality rules on three candidates for large electorates under the impartial culture condition. This study considers the two stage voting rules on three candidates, plurality elimination and negative plurality elimination. A representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of each for large electorates under impartial culture. The Condorcet efficiencies of both rules are equal and are shown to be substantially greater than the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and negative plurality.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departments of Business Administration and Economics, University of Delaware, 19716, Newark, DE, USA

    Williams V. Gehrlein

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  1. Williams V. Gehrlein
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Gehrlein, W.V. Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules. Qual Quant 27, 95–101 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01097012

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01097012

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