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Order and price in a sequential auction

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Abstract

A sequential auction of commercial properties produced evidence that bid timing matters. Prices declined as the auction proceeded, an outcome consistent with expectations when bidders are either risk averse or quantity constrained.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Smeal College of Business, Penn State University, 409 Business Administration Building, 16802, University Park, PA

    Kenneth M. Lusht

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  1. Kenneth M. Lusht
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Lusht, K.M. Order and price in a sequential auction. J Real Estate Finan Econ 8, 259–266 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01096996

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01096996

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