Skip to main content
Log in

Regulation and insurer competition: Did insurers use rate regulation to reduce competition?

  • Published:
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This article examines rate regulation and the market share of insurers using exclusive agents, known as direct writers. Direct writers have lower market share in rate regulation states; however, the effect is observed in both the regulated automobile lines and the less regulated homeowners' insurance. This suggests that statute implementation and not the statue itself affects insurers' market shares. Including measures of the political influence of insurers using nonexclusive agents and that of their agents on regulators in estimation removes the association between regulation and direct writers' market share. Combined with the different parties' support for regulation, the results indicate that nonexclusive agents used political influence to slow direct writers' growth.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Automobile Insurance Plans Service Office, (annual).AIPSO Facts. Johnston, R.I.: Automobile Insurance Plans Service Office.

  • A.M. Best Company. (1972–1983).Best's Executive Data Service, annual. Oldwick, NJ.: A.M. Best Co. Alliance of American Insurers. (1970–June 1987). “Rating Laws by State.” Mimeo.

  • Becker, Gary. (1985). “Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs,”Journal of Public Economics 28, 329–347.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary. (1983) “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,”The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braeutigam, Ronald R., and Mark V. Pauly. (1986). “Cost Function Estimation and Quality Bias: The Regulated Automobile Insurance Industry,”Rand Journal of Economics 17, 606–617.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cather, David A., Sandra G. Gustavson, and James S. Trieschmann. (1985). “A Profitability Analysis of P-L Insurers using Alternative Distribution Systems,”Journal of Risk and Insurance 52, 321–332.

    Google Scholar 

  • Consumer Reports. (1970). “Auto Insurance: The Quality Factor,” 35 (June), 322–41.

  • Consumer Reports. (1977). “Managing Your Auto Insurance, Part 2: Which companies Give the Best Service?” 42 (July), 375–84.

  • Consumer Reports. (1984). “Auto Insurance: Which Companies are Best?” 49 (September), 506–510.

  • Consumer Reports. (1980). “Homeowners' Insurance-Part 2: Which Companies are Rated Best?” 45 (September), 539–543.

  • Consumer Reports. (1985). “Homeowners' Insurance-Part 1: How the Companies Compare,” 50 (August), 473–478.

  • Cummins, J.D., and J. Van Derhei. (1979). “A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems,”Bel Journal of Economics 10, 709–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cummins, D.J., and S.N. Weisbart. (1977).The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Insurance Agency Performance. Glenmont, N.Y.: IMA Education and Research Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • D'Arcy, Stephen, and Neil Doherry. (1990). “Adverse Selection, Private Information and Lowballing in Insurance Markets,”Journal of Business 63, 145–164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Denenberg, Herbert S., Robert D. Eilers, G. Wright Hoffman, Chester A. Kline, Joseph J. Melone, and H. Wayne Snider. (1964).Risk and Insurance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenach, J. (1985). “The Role of Collective Pricing in Auto Insurance.” Staff Report for the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Etgar, Michael. (1977). “Cost Effectiveness in Insurance Distribution,”Journal of Risk and Insurance 44, 211–222.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frech, H., and J. Samprone. (1980). “The Welfare Loss of Excess Nonprice Competition: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance Regulation,”Journal of Law and Economics 23, 429–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grabowski, Henry, W. Kip Viscusi, and William N. Evans. (1989). “Price and Availability Tradeoffs of Automobile Insurance Regulation,”Journal of Risk and Insurance 56, 275–299.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hammes, Carol, Peter Kensicki, E. J. Leverett, and Ronald Anderson. (1986).Agency Operations and Saks Management. Malvern, PA: Insurance Institute of America.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrington, S.E. (1984). “The Impact of Rate Regulation on Prices and Underwriting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Survey,”Journal of Risk and Insurance 51, 577–623.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrington, S.E. (1990). “The Relationship Regulation in Automobile Insurance,”Journal of Risk and Insurance 57, 9–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hensley, Roy F. (1962).Competition, Regulation and the Public Interest in Nonlife Insurance. Berkely, CA: University of California.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holtom, Robert B. (1978). “Producer Compensation Patterns,”CPCU Journal 31, 70–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ippolito, R. (1979). “The Effects of Price Regulation in the Automobile Insurance Industry,”Journal of Law and Economics 22, 55–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, P. (1973a). “Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry,”Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4, 375–427.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, Paul (1973b). “Regulation and Deregulation in the Property-Insurance Industry.” Working paper, MIT.

  • Lee, J.F. (1982). “The Automobile Insurance Shared Market: Significance, Developments and Policy Issues,”Journal of Insurance Regulation 1, 107–122.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lilly, Claude. (1976). “A History of Insurance Regulation in the United States,”CPCU Annals 29, 99–115.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meier, Kenneth. (1988).The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance. Albany, NY: State University of New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (1959).NAIC Proceedings, Vol. 1. Kansas City, MO: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

  • National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (1967).NAIC Proceedings, Vol. 2. Kansas City, MO: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

  • National Association of Insurnace Commissioners. (1968).NAIC Proceedings, Vol. 1. Kansas City, MO: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

  • National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (1969).NAIC Proceedings, Vol. 1. Kansas City, MO: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

  • National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (1984).NAIC Proceedings, Vol. 1. Kansas City, MO: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

  • Nordhaus, George, and Stephen Brown. (1976).Marketing Property-Casualty Insurance. Santa Monica, CA.: Insurance Marketing Services.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pauly, Mark, Hoard Kunreuther, and Paul Kleindorfer. (1986). “Regulation and Quality Competition in the U.S. Insurance Industry.” In Finsinger and Pauly (eds.),The Economics of Insurance Regulation. London: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, Sam. (1986). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,”The Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sass, Tim R., and Micha Gisser. (1989). “Agency Cost, Firm Size and Exclusive Dealing,”Journal of Law and Economics 32, 381–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smallwood, D. (1975). “Competition, Regulation and Product Quality in the Automobile Insurance Industry.” In A. Phillips (ed.),Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, George J. (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation,”Bell Journal of Economics 2, 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, (annual).Handbook of Labor Statistics. Washington, DC:S. Government Printing Office.

  • United States Federal Highway Administration, (annual).Highway Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

  • United States General Accounting Office. (1986).Auto Insurance: State Regulation Affects Cost and Availability. Washington, DC: U.S. GAO.

    Google Scholar 

  • Webb, Bernard L., J.J. Launie, Willis P. Rokes, and Norman A. Baglini. (1984).Insurance Company Operations. Malvern, PA: American Institute for Property and Liability Underwriters.

    Google Scholar 

  • United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. (1961).Insurance: Rates, Rating Organizations and State Regulation. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gron, A. Regulation and insurer competition: Did insurers use rate regulation to reduce competition?. J Risk Uncertainty 11, 87–111 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067679

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067679

Key words

Navigation