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Thanks go to John Aldrich, Robert Bates, William Bernhard, Richard Burdekin, Henry Chappel, Dudley Wallace and Thomas Willett for suggestions and to Ted Smith for computational assistance.
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Havrilesky, T., Granato, J. Determinants of inflationary performance: Corporatist structures vs. central bank autonomy. Public Choice 76, 249–261 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049323
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049323