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Low-cost decisions as a challenge to public choice

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We wish to thank Albert Hart and Anne Meyer zu Himmern for helpful comments.

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Kirchgässner, G., Pommerehne, W.W. Low-cost decisions as a challenge to public choice. Public Choice 77, 107–115 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049224

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