Abstract
Numerous laboratory experiments have investigated the performance of several processes for providing public goods through voluntary contributions. This research has been able to identify features of the institution or environment which are reliably likely to produce outcomes “close” to the free riding outcome or “substantially” greater than the pessimistic prediction of standard models. One such feature is the “marginal per-capita return” (MPCR) from the public good. Various authors have altered MPCR between groups or for an entire group at the same time. The experiments reported here address a different question, “What would happen if, within a group, some persons faced a ‘high’ MPCR while others faced a ‘low’ MPCR?”
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The heterogenous group experiments reported here were conducted at the Economic Science Laboratory of the University of Arizona. All data are archived on the NovaNet computer system and are available from the authors upon request. The financial support of the National Science Foundation, grants SES-8820897 and SES-8821067, is gratefully acknowledged. Fisher and Walker are at Indiana University; Isaac and Schatzberg are at the University of Arizona.
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Fisher, J., Isaac, R.M., Schatzberg, J.W. et al. Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Public Choice 85, 249–266 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01048198
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01048198