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Rent-seeking and institutional stability in developing countries

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We are grateful to Mark Toma, Gordon Tullock, Stephen Drew Smith, Bob Collinge and participants of the rent seeking panel held at the 1990 meetings of the Southern Economic Association for their helpful comments. Remaining errors are our responsibility.

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Kimenyi, M.S., Mbaku, J.M. Rent-seeking and institutional stability in developing countries. Public Choice 77, 385–405 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047877

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